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Abstract
An e-barter multi-agent system consists of a set of agents that exchange goods. These agents may
perform multilateral exchanges involving several goods. In particular, money can be one of these
goods. Each agent is endowed with a utility function indicating the preferences of the respective
user. In order to improve the performance, these barter systems are structured in a hierarchical form.
Initially agents are grouped, according to localities, into local markets. Once a local market gets
completed, that is, no more exchanges are possible, the local market itself becomes a new agent. The
preferences of this agent, given by a new utility function, represent the individual preferences of its
former customer agents. Then, local markets exchange goods in a higher order market until it gets
completed. The process is iterated, in a bottom-up fashion, until the global market embracing all the
agents in the system gets completed as well.
We provide a formal language, based on classical process algebras, for specifying and analyzing
e-barter systems. We also study properties of e-barter systems represented in our notation. In
particular, we show that the final distribution of goods in a hierarchical e-barter system is a Pareto
optimum. In other words, we will be able to prove that economic efficiency is not lost by considering
our hierarchical structure instead of a single market.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
✩Research partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología project MASTER (TIC2003-
07848-C02-01), the Junta de Comunidades de Castilla-La Mancha project DISMEF (PAC-03-001), and the Marie
Curie Research and Training Network TAROT (MRTN-CT-2003-505121).∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: mn@sip.ucm.es (M. Núñez), isrodrig@sip.ucm.es (I. Rodríguez), fernando@sip.ucm.es
(F. Rubio).
0167-6423/$ - see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.scico.2005.01.002
188 M. Núñez et al. / Science of Computer Programming 57 (2005) 187–216
Keywords: e-barter; Formal methods; Process algebras; Pareto optimum
1. Introduction
The creation and study of communities where intelligent (electronic) agents replace
their (human) owners is a topic that has attracted a lot of interest. In particular, there
is ongoing research in technologies able to model users by means of agents which
autonomously perform electronic transactions (see [9] for a survey on the topic). In order
to increase the power of these agents they must know the preferences of the corresponding
user. In this line, the concept of utility function is very useful. Essentially, a utility function
returns a real number for each possible basket of goods: the bigger this number is, the
happier the owner is with this basket.
Intuitively, agents should act as the customer that they are representing by considering
the utility function that the corresponding user has in mind (see e.g. [25,7,6,14,19,11]).
In fact, there exist several proposals showing how agents can be trained to learn the
preferences of users (see e.g. [1,6,26]). Besides this, a formal definition of the preferences
of the user provides the agent with some negotiation capacity when interacting with other
agents [12,26,15]. Let us remark that, in most cases, utility functions take a very simple
form. For instance, they may indicate that a customer C is willing to exchange the item
a for the items b and c. Obviously, a customer must have the possibility of changing the
utility function that the agent uses to represent its preferences. Once the agent is notified
of these modifications, it will change its negotiation strategy accordingly.
An e-barter system consists of a set of agents performing exchanges of products. The
notion of e-barter that we will use in this paper was initially introduced in [16,17]. This
work has been continued in [4] where a test derivation framework for e-barter systems has
been introduced. In order to formalize e-barter systems we borrow from Microeconomics
the concepts of utility function, fair exchange, and Pareto optimum (see [18] for a very
formal and rigorous presentation of microeconomic theory). We will elaborate on these
concepts in the next section. In contrast with the usual understanding of e-commerce,
e-barter does not necessarily reduce all the transactions to money: an exchange is
performed if the parts involved are happier with their new items. In our framework we
consider that money is just another possible resource: an agent may be willing to exchange
the good a for (m units of the good) money. Let us remark that this is not the usual treatment
of money in general equilibrium theory where money is simply used to set relative prices.
As a matter of fact, e-barter allows a rich structure of exchanges. For example, let us
suppose a very simple circular situation where for each 1 ≤ i ≤ r we have that the agent Ai
owns the good ai and desires the good a(i mod r)+1. Such a situation is graphically depicted
in Fig. 1 for the case of three agents and three goods. This multi-agent transaction can be
easily performed within our framework so that each of the agents obtains the desired item.
In contrast, it would not be so easy to perform it if these items must be first converted into
money. For example, if the agent A2 requests money from A1 as payment for the good a2
then it may happen that A2 has no money to give away. As a result, the whole circular
exchange could not be concluded, in spite of the fact that all agents would get happier if
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Fig. 1. Exchange of items in the presence of circular dependencies.
it were performed. Let us also note that if exchanges are restricted to being bilateral then
we would also lose some good deals. For example, the agent A2 will not be willing to give
away its item since it is not interested in the item owned by A1.
In e-barter systems, agents are grouped according to the localities of the corresponding
customers (see Fig. 2). First, agents are combined into local markets (e.g. customers living
in the same city). Once this market gets completed, that is, when no more exchanges can be
performed, an agent representing the interests of all the agents in the market is created. The
new agents will be again grouped into markets (e.g. agents are grouped by counties). This
situation is repeated until a global market is created. This hierarchical structure presents
at least two advantages. First, shipping costs are diminished because agents will exchange
resources as close to the location of the customer as possible. Second, by creating new
(representative) agents once a market is completed and by combining them into higher
order markets, we keep a small number of agents belonging to a certain market. This is very
relevant if we take into account that a big number of agents would make it very difficult
to find the products that they are looking for. This is so because the number of messages
that agents send to communicate with each other dramatically increases with the number
of agents in the market. Finally, let us note that if an agent does not find the product that
it is looking for in a local market, there will be a new agent looking for the same product
(and taking into account the preferences of the original agent) in a bigger market.
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Fig. 2. Example of a hierarchical market structure.
In order to formally specify e-barter systems we will use a process algebraic notation
based on the language PAMR [21,22]. This language is very suitable for our purposes
because it was specially developed to deal with the specification and analysis of concurrent
and distributed systems where resources play a fundamental role. Nevertheless, PAMR does
not provide a higher order constructor such as the one needed in e-barter systems, so
the language has to be extended. In addition to a syntax, we will provide an operational
semantics for the new language. By doing so, every stage of the creation of an e-barter
system may be formally specified, avoiding ambiguities and providing a clear structure of
the system. It is worth pointing out that designers of e-barter systems do not need to go
through all the semantic machinery. In fact, it is enough if they understand how the syntax
of our language works, so that they can define the systems that they are interested in.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some auxiliary
notation and the microeconomic concepts that we will use in this paper. Section 3
represents the bulk of the paper. First, we give an informal description of the behavior
of e-barter systems. Next, we present a formalization of all the necessary concepts to
specify e-barter systems. In Section 4 we discuss some issues concerning the practical
implementation of our framework. Afterwards, in Section 5, we study the main theoretical
properties of e-barter systems. In particular, we show that by using a hierarchical structure
we do not lose economic efficiency. Next, in Section 6 we present our conclusions. Finally,
in the appendix of this paper we present the proofs of some auxiliary results that are used
in Section 5.
2. Basic concepts
In this section we introduce some concepts that we will use during the rest of this paper.
Specifically, we present the notions of utility function and we explain how operational rules
for a process algebra are defined. First we present some mathematical notation.
Definition 1. We consider R+ = {x ∈ R | x ≥ 0}. We will usually denote vectors in Rn
(for n ≥ 2) by x, y, . . .. Given x ∈ Rn , xi denotes its i -th component. We extend to vectors
some usual arithmetic operations. Let x, y ∈ Rn . We define the addition of vectors x and
y, denoted by x + y, simply as (x1 + y1, . . . , xn + yn). We write x ≤ y if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n
we have xi ≤ yi .
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We will usually denote matrices in An×m (for n, m ≥ 2, and a set A) by calligraphic
letters E, E1, . . .. 
The relevant characteristics of the customers of an e-barter system are their baskets
of resources (indicating the items that they own) and their utility functions (indicating
preference among different baskets of resources).
Definition 2. We will suppose that there exist p > 0 different kinds of resources. Baskets
of resources are defined as vectors x ∈ Rp+. A utility function is a function u : Rp+ −→
R. 
In microeconomic theory there are some restrictions that are usually imposed on utility
functions (mainly strict monotonicity, convexity, and continuity). Intuitively, given a utility
function u we have that u(x) < u(y) means that the basket y is preferred to x .
The main feature of e-barter systems is that agents exchange resources. Let us suppose
a system with n agents where p different types of product can be exchanged. Each agent
has as information from the customer a pair (x, u), with x ∈ Rp+ and u : Rp+ → R+.
The first component of the pair denotes the amounts that the customer owns of each kind
of product. The second component is the utility function indicating the preferences of
the customer with respect to the different products. A subset of agents will be willing
to exchange resources if none of them decrease their utility and at least one of them
improves. These exchanges are called fair. Formally, let us consider a set of indexes
A = {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and let us take, for any i ∈ A, the pair (xi , ui ). Let us
suppose that after the exchange we have that the information associated with the agents
belonging to A is given by the pairs (yi , ui ), that is, the corresponding utility function
remains while the basket of resources varies from xi to yi . We will say that the exchange
is fair if for any i ∈ A we have ui (xi ) ≤ ui (yi ) and there exists j ∈ A such that
u j (x j ) < u j (y j ). Let us remark that a necessary condition for an exchange is that no
products are created/destroyed, that is,
∑
i∈A xi =
∑
i∈A yi . Eventually, the system will
reach a situation where no more exchanges can be performed. In other words, it is not
possible to improve the situation of one agent without causing another one to deteriorate.
Such a situation is called Pareto optimum. In order to determine the set of optima of a
system, techniques inherited from game theory can be used (see e.g. [28,24,27]).
We consider that customers have to pay a fee depending on the products that they
exchange. Besides this, shipping costs will be collected as well. In order to compute
shipping costs we have to take into account not only the products that the customer
receives. We also need to consider the distance between the sender and the receiver.
Actually, these costs may have a strong influence in the behavior of systems. In particular,
some fair exchanges will not be performed due to the additional costs. Moreover, we have
to adapt the notion of Pareto optimum.1 Let us illustrate this situation by means of a simple
example.
1 In microeconomics terms, the problem is that we partially lose the notion of contract curve because the
induced generalized Edgeworth box shrinks after an exchange. Specifically, the problem is that money is taken
out of the system due to the above-mentioned costs. We assume that these costs are collected by a generic agent
that it is not explicitly represented.
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Example 1. Let us consider a system with two users and two products. In addition, we
consider money as the third product. Let us suppose that the initial distributions are (0, 3, 5)
and (2, 1, 10), respectively, while the corresponding utility functions are defined as
u1(x1, x2, x3) = 30·x1+10·x2+x3 and u2(x1, x2, x3) = 10·x1+10·x2+x3, respectively.
Intuitively, the first user is indifferent between one unit of the first product and three units
of the second product. If the first user gives two units of the second product in exchange
for one unit of the first product, both users improve. That is, u1(0, 3, 5) < u1(1, 1, 5) and
u2(2, 1, 10) < u2(1, 3, 10). However, this exchange could be disallowed if we consider
transaction and shipping costs. In this case, we would have to decide whether we have both
u1(0, 3, 5) ≤ u1(1, 1, 5 − t1 − c1) and u2(2, 1, 10) ≤ u2(1, 3, 10 − t2 − c2), where ti
denotes the transaction costs associated with the goods received by i while ci denotes the
shipping costs according to the distance between the users. Besides this, in order to have a
fair exchange, one of the previous inequalities must be strict. If the exchange is performed,
the manager/owner of the system will increase its amount of money by t1 + t2 units. Thus,
the total amount of money owned by the users is reduced in t1 + t2 + c1 + c2 units. 
Process algebras (see [10,20,2] for the classical notions and [3] for a recent overview on
the hot topics) are formal languages used to specify and verify distributed and concurrent
systems. As we pointed out in the introduction of this paper, we will use such a language
to formalize e-barter systems. The syntax of these languages is given as an EBNF
expression. In order to assign meaning to syntactic terms, an operational semantics is
usually introduced. Operational rules are defined as deduction rules. That is, a rule
Premise1 ∧ Premise2 ∧ · · · ∧ Premisen
Conclusion
must be interpreted as: If all of the premises hold then we can deduce the conclusion.
Premises usually indicate individual behaviors of components of a system; conclusions
indicate how the system behaves according to individual performances. Let us remark that
if a rule has no premises then the conclusion trivially holds.
3. Formalizing e-barter systems
In this section we present how e-barter systems are organized. First, we show the basic
algorithm underlying the definition of e-barter systems. Next we introduce the formal
framework for specifying e-barter systems.
3.1. Basic behavior of e-barter systems
Customers willing to participate in an e-barter system are represented by (electronic)
agents.2 These agents are provided with two parameters: the basket of resources that
the customer is willing to exchange and a utility function. Once an agent has reached a
(possibly multilateral) deal, it must be notified to the customer. If all the customers give
2 In terms of [30], our agents present as information attitude belief (versus knowledge), while as pro-attitudes
we may consider commitment and choice (versus intention and obligation).
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their approval then the deal will be effectively performed, transaction fees will be added,
and shipping costs will be computed according to both the amount of received items and
the distance between the involved customers.
From now on we concentrate on the behavior of the different electronic entities. Even
though we will formally define the behavior of e-barter systems, it is convenient to start by
giving an informal explanation of how these systems work. Essentially, the behavior of an
e-barter system follows this algorithm:
(1) Each agent generates the barters that its customer would be willing to perform
(according to the corresponding basket of resources and utility functions).
(2) Agents exchange goods inside their local market. A multilateral exchange will be
performed if (at least) one of the agents involved improves its utility and none of them
decrease their utility. This is repeated until no more exchanges are possible. In this
case we say that the local market is completed.
(3) Once a market is completed, their agents are combined to create a new agent. This
agent behaves as a representative of the combined agents. The new agent will have as
its basket of resources the union of the baskets corresponding to each agent. Its utility
function will encode the utilities of the combined agents. First order agents will be
combined again into markets, according to proximity reasons.
(4) Higher order agents trade until their market gets completed.
(5) Once a (higher order) market gets completed, the agents start to allocate the resources
in a top-down way through the tree of markets until the resources arrive at the leaves of
the tree (i.e. the original agents). Then, a new agent is created (as indicated in step 3).
(6) Once their markets get completed, new markets are created by combining agents until
there exists a unique market. Once this last market gets completed, and the resources
are conveniently allocated, the whole tree of agents is reset, and we start again at the
first step.
As we have already indicated in the introduction of the paper, the previous behavior
ensures some good properties. In particular, exchanges are made between agents located
as near as possible, that is, shipping costs are minimized. Besides this, the hierarchical
structure improves the computational efficiency of the system. This is so because the
communication overload would make the efficiency fall in a system where all the agents
are connected to a single market. In such scenario, a single market would be responsible for
all the transactions and communications. Thus, its delays would become the bottleneck of
the system performance. Moreover, if the single market crashes then no exchange will be
possible in the system any longer (no matter whether the exchange involves nearby agents
or not). Thus, the hierarchical structure is safer and more efficient from the computational
point of view. In addition, as we will show in Section 5, the economic efficiency of a
hierarchical market matches that of a non-hierarchical market.
3.2. e-barter systems: syntax and semantics
In this section we provide a formal syntax and semantics for the definition of e-barter
systems. Even though we use a process algebraic notation (mainly when defining the
operational rules) we do not need most of the usual operators appearing in this kind of
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language (choice, restriction, etc.). In fact, our constructions recall a parallel operator such
as the one presented in the process algebra CCS [20].
Definition 3. A market system is given by the following EBNF:
M S ::= ms(M)
M ::= A | uncomp((M, . . . , M), sh, pr) | σ(M)
A ::= (S, u, x , sh, pr)
S ::= [ ] | [A, . . . , A]. 
First, in order to avoid ambiguity of the grammar, we annotate market systems with
the terminal symbol ms. Intuitively, the market M = (S, u, x, sh, pr) (that is, M =
A) represents a completed market, that is, a market where no more exchanges can be
performed among its agents. Let us note that in this case the market represents an agent
that will be able to make transactions with other agents in a higher market. In the previous
expression, u denotes the utility function of M and x represents the basket of resources
owned by M . We consider that there are p different commodities,3 that is x ∈ Rp+, and
that the amount of money is placed in the last component of the tuple. Besides this, sh
is the shipping function indicating the shipping cost of each possible transaction in this
market. In turn, pr is the profit collected by the market due to transaction costs. We will
assume the existence of another function, the transaction function, denoted by tr. This last
function computes the transaction costs for each of the agents involved in an exchange by
taking into account the goods that each agent receives. Let us remark that while shipping
costs will depend on the market in which the transaction is performed, transaction costs do
not. By taking this approach we can formally specify that shipping costs increase with the
distance between customers.
Regarding the first argument of M there are two possible situations. Either S is an
empty list or not. In the first case we have that M represents an original agent, that is,
a direct representative of a customer (note that a single agent is trivially completed since
there is nobody to deal with). In the second case, if S = [A1, . . . , An] then we have
that M represents an agent associated with the (possible higher order) agents A1, . . . , An
belonging to a completed market.
The second possible syntactic form of M , uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr), represents
an uncompleted market consisting of the markets M1, . . . , Mn , the shipping function sh
and the profit value pr. Let us remark that in this case some of the sub-markets may be
completed. Once all the markets of the system get completed, the whole system is turned
again into uncompleted. The last form of M , σ(M), represents that such an operation must
be performed on M .
Next we present an example showing how an e-barter system may be constructed. In this
example we will also (informally) introduce the operational transitions of the language.
3 We are assuming that all the items are goods. Nevertheless, agents could also trade bads. For example, a
customer would be willing to give an apple pie if he or she receives minus s brown leaves in his garden. However,
bads are usually not considered in microeconomic theory, as they can be easily turned into goods: Instead of
considering the amount of leaves, one may consider the absence of them.
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Fig. 3. A market system and some operational transitions.
Example 2. Let us consider a system with six agents Ai = ([ ], ui , xi , sh0, 0), for
1 ≤ i ≤ 6, where sh0 denotes a dummy shipping function. We suppose that these
agents are grouped into three different markets. Initially, these markets are uncompleted
(uncompleted markets are represented by a single square in the figure), so we make the
following definitions:
M1 = uncomp((A1, A2), sh1, 0)
M2 = uncomp((A3, A4), sh2, 0)
M3 = uncomp((A5, A6), sh3, 0).
Let us consider that the first two markets are linked, and that the resulting market is also
linked to the remaining market M3. We should add the following definitions:
M4 = uncomp((M1, M2), sh4, 0)
M5 = uncomp((M4, M3), sh5, 0).
Finally, the global market is defined as M = ms(M5). This hierarchical structure is
graphically presented in Fig. 3, top left.
Following the philosophy explained in the previous section, transactions will be made
within a market only among completed sub-markets. So, initially only M1, M2, and M3
are allowed to perform transactions (as we remarked before, original agents are trivially
completed).
We will use the symbol  to denote exchange of resources. Let us suppose that,
after some exchanges, M1 gets completed. That is, there exists a sequence of exchanges
M1  M11  M
2
1 · · ·  Mn1 = M ′1 such that M ′1 	. We will usually write M1 ∗M ′1
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to denote that such a sequence of exchanges can be performed. In this case, the market
grouping the first two agents should be labeled as completed. So, the agents effectively
perform all the achieved transactions, becoming A′1 and A′2, respectively. Then, the first
market will be turned into ([A′1, A′2], f (u1, u2), x1 + x2 − (0, 0, . . . , costs1), sh1, pr1),
where f is a function combining utility functions (such a function will be formally defined
later), pr1 is the amount of money that the system has obtained due to the fees applied
to the exchange of goods, and costs1 denotes the transaction and shipping costs associated
with the products exchanged in the market M1. In parallel, M2 will have a similar behavior.
Once both M1 and M2 get completed, transactions between them will be allowed.
Note that these transactions (inside the market M4) will be performed according to the
new utility functions, f (u1, u2) and f (u3, u4), and to the new baskets of resources,
x1 + x2 − (0, 0, . . . , costs1) and x3 + x4 − (0, 0, . . . , costs2).
The process will iterate until M5 gets completed. At this point, we will have a market
as σ(M ′5). Then, the global market is structurally reset. 
In order to simplify forthcoming operational rules we introduce the following notation
to deal with utility functions. Utility functions associated with original agents (that is,
A = ([ ], u, x, sh, 0)) will behave as explained in Definition 2. That is, u(z) indicates
the relative preference shown by A towards the basket of resources z. Nevertheless, if
A = ([A1, . . . , An], u, x, sh, pr) then we will consider that, in addition to its usual
meaning, the utility function also keeps track of how a basket of resources is distributed
among the (possible higher order) agents A1, . . . , An . That is, u(z) = (r, z1, . . . , zn),
where r still represents the utility, while
∑
zi = z and zi denotes the portion of the basket
z assigned to Ai . Overloading the notation, if we simply write u(z) we are referring to the
first component of the tuple, while u(z).i denotes the (i + 1)-th component of the tuple.
Later we will see how the utility functions following this pattern are actually defined.
In the next definition we present the anchor case of our operational semantics. In order
to perform complex exchanges, agents should first indicate the barters they are willing to
accept.
Definition 4. Let A = (S, u, x , sh, pr) be a completed market. The exchanges the agent A
would perform are given by the following operational rules:
u(x + y) ≥ u(x) ∧ (x + y) ≥ 0
(S, u, x, sh, pr) y−−→ (S, u, x + y, sh, pr)
u(x + y) > u(x) ∧ (x + y) ≥ 0
(S, u, x, sh, pr) y
−→ (S, u, x + y, sh, pr)
where y ∈ Rp , p being the number of different commodities. 
Let us remark that y may have negative components. Actually, these tuples will contain
the barters offered by the agent. For example, if y = (1,−1, 0,−3) fulfills the premise
then the agent would accept a barter where it is offered one unit of the first product in
exchange for one unit of the second good and three units of money. As regards the rules,
the first premise simply indicates that the agent would not decrease (resp. would increase)
its utility. The second premise indicates that the agent does not run into red numbers,
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∃ k ∈ I : Mk yk
−→ M ′k ∧ ∀ i ∈ I, Mi
yi−−→ M ′i ∧ valid(M, E , (cost1, . . . , costn))
M E uncomp((M ′1, . . . , M ′n), sh, pr +
∑
i tr(
∑
j E j i ))
where • M = uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr)
• E ∈(Rp+)n×n and I = {s1, . . . , sr } ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
• M ′i =
{
Mi i /∈ I
(Si , ui , xi + yi , shi , pri ) otherwise
• yi =
∑
j E j i −
∑
j Ei j −(0, . . . , 0, costi ), for any i ∈ I
• costi = tr(
∑
j E j i )+sh(
∑
j E j i ), for any i ∈ I
Fig. 4. Operational rule for the exchange of resources in an uncompleted market.
that is, an agent cannot offer a quantity of an item if it does not own it. Thus, a transition
as −−→ denotes that the agent does not worsen; a transition as 
−→ denotes that the agent
does improve.
Even though transaction and shipping costs do not explicitly appear in the previous
rules, they are implicitly reflected in the last component of the corresponding tuples
y. That is, they are considered in the amount of money that the agents are willing to
give away to perform a given exchange. As we mentioned before, these costs may have
an important influence in the exchanges that an agent will be willing to perform: high
shipping/transaction costs will produce the result that some exchanges are less attractive.
Example 3. Let us consider an agent that evaluates the price of an apple in 1$. This amount
includes any additional costs that could be associated with the acquisition of an apple. In
fact, the agent should not care about whether the proportion of shipping and transaction
costs is high or not, provided that the final cumulated price is not higher than 1$. Let
us suppose another agent who has apples and it is willing to sell them by any amount
bigger than 0.9$. These two agents can indeed exchange apples by money at any price
0.9 ≤ price ≤ 1. However, if shipping plus transaction costs are equal to 0.15$ then the
deal will not be possible. 
We will later formalize how additional costs are assigned to the owner of the system
and to the shipping companies. Next we show how offers are combined.
Definition 5. Let M = uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr) be an uncompleted market and
I = {s1, . . . , sr } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be a set of indexes denoting the completed markets
belonging to M (that is, for any i ∈ I we have that Mi = (Si , ui , xi , shi , pri )). We say that
the matrix E ∈ (Rp+)n×n is a valid exchange matrix for M under the cost tuple c, denoted
by valid(M, E, c), if the following conditions hold:
• for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have∑ j Ei j ≤ xi − (0, . . . , 0, ci ),
• for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have Eii = 0, and
• for any 1 ≤ i, k ≤ n such that k 	∈ I we have Eki = 0 and Eik = 0. 
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First, let us note that the notion of valid matrix is considered only in the context
of uncompleted markets: if a market is already completed then no more exchanges
can be performed. Second, only completed markets belonging to an uncompleted one
may perform exchanges among them. This restriction allows one to give priority to
transactions performed by closer agents belonging to uncompleted sub-markets. Regarding
the definition of valid matrix, the components of matrices E are baskets of resources
(that is, elements belonging to Rp+). Thus, Ei j represents the basket of resources that the
market Mi would give to M j . In the tuple c, the component ci denotes the transaction
and shipping costs that the agent Mi will have to afford. So, for any market Mi , the
condition
∑
j Ei j ≤ xi − (0, . . . , 0, ci ) indicates that the total amount of resources given
by this market to other markets must be less than or equal to the basket of resources
owned by that market minus the money paid by the transaction. Finally, let us comment
that an exchange does not need to include all of the completed markets. That is, if
we have an exchange where only r ′ markets participate, then the rows and columns
corresponding to the remaining r −r ′ completed markets will be filled with 0. Besides this,
the rows and columns corresponding to the n − r uncompleted markets will also be filled
with 0.
Next we introduce the rules defining the exchange of resources. Intuitively, if we have
a valid exchange matrix where at least one of the agents involved improves and no one
worsens then the corresponding exchange can be performed.
Definition 6. Let M = uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr) be an uncompleted market and
I = {s1, . . . , sr } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be a set of indexes denoting the completed markets
belonging to M (that is, for any i ∈ I we have that Mi = (Si , ui , xi , shi , pri )). The
operational transitions denoting the exchange of resources that M may perform are given
by the rule shown in Fig. 4. We say that M is a local optimum, denoted by M 	, if there
do not exist M ′ and E such that M E M ′. 
The operational rule presented in Fig. 4 is applied under the same conditions as appear
in the definition of a valid exchange matrix: it is applied to uncompleted markets and the
exchange is made among a subset of the completed sub-markets. The premises indicate
that at least one completed market improves after the exchange and that none deteriorates.
Let us recall that, in general, a market may generate both Mi
y−−→ M ′i and Mi
y
−→ M ′i . So,
the previous rule also considers situations where more than one market improves (we only
require that at least one improves). Besides this, let us remark that Mi 0−−→ M ′i always
holds. So, a market not involved in the current exchange does not disallow the exchange.
The tuple of costs appearing in the condition ensuring the validity of the exchange matrix
will be computed from both transaction and shipping costs. As regards the conclusion,
sub-markets belonging to M are modified according to both the corresponding exchange
matrix and the costs of the exchange, while uncompleted sub-markets do not change. Let
us remark that the costs of each exchange will be paid by the receiver. Besides this, only
the transaction costs will be added to the cumulated profit of the market. The following
result easily follows from the previous definition. It indicates that exchanges allowed by
the previous rule are fair.
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Proposition 1. Let M = uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr) be an uncompleted market and
let I = {s1, . . . , sr } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be the set of indexes denoting the completed markets
belonging to M (that is, for any i ∈ I we have that Mi = (Si , ui , xi , shi , pri )). Let us
suppose that there exists a valid exchange matrix E such that we have a transition
uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr)
E
 uncomp((M ′1, . . . , M
′
n), sh, pr′)
where M ′i = (Si , ui , x ′i , shi , pri ). Then, for any i ∈ I we have ui (xi) ≤ ui (x ′i ). In addition,
there exists j ∈ I such that u j (x j ) < u j (x ′j ). 
In addition to the previous inference rule we need to consider the following two
exchanging rules:
Mk
E
 M ′k
uncomp((M1, . . . , Mk , . . . , Mn), sh, pr)
E
uncomp((M1, . . . , M ′k , . . . , Mn), sh, pr)
M E M ′
ms(M) E ms(M ′)
.
The first rule indicates that if an uncompleted sub-market produces an exchange then
the market must take that situation into account. The second rule reflects modifications
within the scope of the constructor ms.
If a market reaches an optimum then we need to modify the attribute of the market by
replacing a term such as uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr) by a term such as (S, u, x, sh, pr′).
Once a market gets completed, the money collected in the different sub-markets as
transaction costs will be transferred to it. In addition, resources are recursively moved
from the corresponding agents to the leaves of the tree. Let us remark that a market gets
completed when all of its sub-markets are completed. The following rule uses two auxiliary
notions that will be formally presented in the forthcoming Definition 8.
Definition 7. Let M = uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr) be a market, where for any 1 ≤
i ≤ n we have Mi = (Si , ui , xi , shi , pri ). The following rule modifies the market from
uncompleted to completed:
M 	
M 
(
[M ′1, . . . , M ′n ], u,
∑
xi , sh, pr +
∑
i
pri
)
where u = CreateUtility(u1, . . . , un, x1, . . . , xn) and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
M ′i = (S′i , ui , xi , shi , 0) and S′i = Deliver(Si , ui , xi ). 
Let us remark that in the previous rule the transition is not labeled. These transitions
play a role similar to internal transitions in classical process algebras. The presence of a
negative premise in the previous rule deserves some comment. In fact, negative premises
can induce inconsistent transition systems. Fortunately, we do not have this problem.
Intuitively, let us note that no transition is a premise of a rule deriving a E transition,
for some valid exchange matrix E . Thus, we cannot construct a cycle such as M 	 implies
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M E M ′, for some M ′. Actually, it is very easy to give a stratification to ensure that
the transitions systems are well defined (the interested reader can check [8] to see how
stratifications are defined).
We need to add two more rules, as in the previous case, to record transformations given
by a transition in the context of different constructors:
Mk  M ′k
uncomp((M1, . . . , Mk , . . . , Mn), sh, pr)uncomp((M1, . . . , M ′k , . . . , Mn), sh, pr)
M  M ′
ms(M) ms(M ′)
.
In the following definition we present the pending functions. Intuitively, the function
Deliver(S, u, x) distributes the basket of resources x among the original agents, which
are located in the leaves of the tree S. This distribution considers both the utility functions
of the agents and the quantities of resources contributed by each of the agents. Besides
this, the application of the function CreateUtility(u1, . . . , un, x1, . . . , xn) computes
a combined utility function from the ones provided as arguments. Let us recall that, in
our context, utility functions of higher order agents do not only reveal preference. In
addition, they also record how resources will be distributed among agents. Thus, if we
are considering an agent representing n agents, a new utility function returning a tuple
with n + 1 components will be created. The first component contains the value of the
utility function. It will return the smallest utility (that is, 0) if any of the represented agents
worsens after the new distribution of goods. So, it is guaranteed that the market does not
perform an exchange which causes any of its clients to deteriorate. In the general case, the
value of the utility will be the addition of the individual utilities applied to the distribution
of resources which maximizes this value. The next components contain the portion of the
resources assigned to each of the agents.
Definition 8. Let A = (S, u, x, sh, pr) be an agent. The allocation of the basket of
resources x among the agents belonging to S with respect to the utility function u, denoted
by Deliver(S, u, x), is recursively defined as:
Deliver(S, u, x) =
{[ ] if S = [ ]
[M ′1, . . . , M ′n ] if S = [M1, . . . , Mn ]
where for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have that if Mi = (Si , ui , xi , shi , pri ) then
M ′i = (Deliver(Si , ui , u(x).i), ui , u(x).i, shi , pri ).
Let us consider n pairs (ui , xi ). The utility function constructed from the utility
functions u1, . . . , un with respect to the baskets of resources x1, . . . , xn , denoted by
CreateUtility(u1, . . . , un, x1, . . . , xn), is defined as:
max
{(∑
i
ui (x
′
i ), x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n
) ∣∣∣∣∣∑i x ′i = x ∧ ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n : ui (x ′i ) ≥ ui (xi )
}
.
We consider that the previous maximization is performed over the first argument
(representing the utility) and we assume max ∅ = (0, 0, . . . , 0). 
Next, in order to define how markets evolve, we compose sequences of transitions.
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ms((S, u, x, sh, pr)) ⇒pr ms(σ ((S, u, x, sh, 0)))
σ (([ ], u, x, sh, pr)) ↪→ ([ ], u, x, sh, pr)
S = [A1, . . . , An]
σ((S, u, x , sh, pr)) ↪→ uncomp((σ (A1), . . . , σ (An)), sh, pr)
Mk ↪→ M ′k
uncomp((M1, . . . , Mk , . . . , Mn), sh, pr) ↪→uncomp((M1, . . . , M ′k , . . . , Mn), sh, pr)
M ↪→ M ′
ms(M) ↪→ ms(M ′)
Fig. 5. Rules for resetting a global market.
Definition 9. We say that a market M evolves into a market M ′, denoted by M ∗M ′, if
there exist markets M1, . . . , Mn−1 such that
M a1 M1
a2
 M2
a3
 · · · Mn−1 an M ′
where for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have that ai is either an empty label or an exchange matrix. 
Finally, we provide a mechanism to reset a global market. If the root of the tree becomes
a completed market then the whole tree of markets is created again. This is done by
considering the five rules shown in Fig. 5. The first one initiates the process of turning
all the markets back to uncompleted mode, provided that the global market has become
completed. In this case, the transition is labeled by the global amount of money collected
as transaction fees. The other rules define how to recursively reset the tree from the root to
the leaves (original customers).
4. Practical implementation of an e-barter system
In spite of the main scope of our framework being theoretical, we would like to briefly
and informally discuss some issues that should be addressed in order to implement an
e-barter system. First of all, we need to have in mind that there must be an underlying
hierarchical structure for appropriately representing the system. Next, the most important
decision consists in choosing one of the different possibilities for the architecture of an
e-barter system. The main point guiding the design of the architecture is whether (higher
order or basic) agents, connected to some market in the hierarchical structure, should be
able to negotiate and make transactions in a pairwise way, without the monitoring of a
third party. If we consider that this is the case then the negotiation process would be
decentralized and the architecture of an e-barter system would be close to using a peer
to peer system for each of the represented markets. Previous work shows how, under some
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specific conditions, a pairwise interaction of agents following a given set of rules can yield
an overall optimal distribution of resources (see [13] for one of the first proposals in this
line). These architectures have the advantage of eliminating the necessity of solving the
optimization problem in a centralized way. However, the necessity of a third party is not
completely removed. In particular, it will be still needed to put in contact agents with
somewhat complementary necessities. Besides this, there exists a constraint on the utility
functions since they are required to have specific forms to guarantee the convergence to
an optimum. In fact, as we showed in the introduction of this paper, there are simple
situations where bilateral fair exchanges, that is, ones where neither of the two agents
involved worsens its situation, are not enough to guarantee that an optimum is reached.
Since the use of a hierarchical structure allows one to bind the maximal number of
agents participating in each optimization subproblem, the delegation of optimization tasks
to third parties is not a big disadvantage. In fact, in contrast to the previous decentralized
alternative, our proposal is of an architecture where a (logical) server is allocated to
represent each of the markets represented in the structural tree. Initially, each basic agent
sends its utility function to a local market. This market will optimize the distribution of
resources according to the received utility functions. Once this market is completed, it
becomes a higher order agent, and it sends its (representative) utility function to a higher
order market, and so on. Let us note that agents must trust that the markets will perform
the optimizations in a fair manner. So, activities of markets should be verified and certified
by some certification institution.
Regarding fairness, it is very important that utility functions are kept private. That is, no
agent should know a utility function except its owner. If an agent knew the utility functions
of other agents trading within its market, it could modify its own utility function so that
the set of possible optima were more favorable to its true interests. Hence, secure channels
should be used to communicate utility functions to market servers. Since guessing the
utility functions of other users can be profitable, agents have an incentive to speculate on
the behavior of other agents, which opens the possibility of complex strategic behaviors.
In general, using rules that promote complex behaviors is undesirable since computational
effort will be wasted overall. Some schema, like the Generalized Vickrey Auction (see for
example [29,18]), impose special rules to guarantee that users do not have any incentive
to lie when communicating their utility functions. Basically, each agent must pay an
additional fee that corresponds to the amount of utility lost by other agents because of
the participation of this agent. Let us note that this approach requires performing n + 1
optimizations, n being the number of participants.
In order to resolve each of the implicit optimization problems, we can still use
techniques inherited from game theory. In particular, several algorithms that converge to
optimal distributions through the iteration of successive adjustments have been proposed
(see for example [13,5,23]). Let us remark that resolving the problem of optimizing the
addition of functions is, in general, a very (computationally) complex problem. This is why
these iterative algorithms usually carry a constraint on the specific form of utility functions.
Thus, a tradeoff has to be taken between the expressivity for denoting preferences and the
computational power for resolving the problem.
Finally, since reaching an optimum distribution of resources can be difficult, we might
remove the necessity of finding optimal distributions. In fact, this is the way in which
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human economic interaction is usually performed. In this case, suboptimal algorithms
could be provided so that the trade among agents stops when a good enough distribution of
resources is reached. Among the most relevant alternatives we may mention the following:
• To iterate until a certain number of transactions has been performed.
• To iterate while the amount of exchanged goods in each transaction exceeds some
minimal threshold.
• To iterate while the variation of utility of the agents involved is higher than a minimal
threshold.
5. Properties of e-barter systems
In this section we formally study the main economic properties of our e-barter systems.
In particular, we will show that the economic efficiency of a hierarchical e-barter system
matches (at least) that corresponding to a non-hierarchical system where all the agents
are directly linked to one single market embracing all the agents. This means that the
final configurations reached in the hierarchical system will be as good as those we would
reach in a non-hierarchical system. In particular, any final distribution of goods reached
in a hierarchical e-barter system would actually be a Pareto optimum in a system where a
(unique) centralized market was used. Actually, due to the fact that our e-barter systems
encourage exchanges between nearby users, we have that shipping costs are reduced. In
fact, if some clients find what they desire in a local market then they will be able to
satisfy their necessities at low shipping costs. So, the utility lost by clients in terms of
shipping costs will be low. Transactions will be made in higher order markets only if
some necessities could not be satisfied in local markets. Thus, the economic efficiency
of a hierarchical structure, from the client’s point of view, could be higher than that of
a centralized market. Our formal analysis will focus on checking that all distributions
reached by our systems are Pareto optimal, which ensures that, at least, they match
the efficiency of a non-hierarchical system. In addition to the previously commented
drawbacks of having a unique market, hierarchical systems are more efficient from a
computational point of view. In particular, the number of messages exchanged between
agents strongly decreases.
Next, we introduce some preliminary definitions. The first one is used to identify the set
of basic agents of a market (i.e. the customer agents located in the leaves of the structural
tree). This definition applies to both completed and uncompleted markets. The basic agents
will be given in the form of pairs (utility function, tuple of resources).
Definition 10. Let M be a market. The set of basic agents of M , denoted by Basic(M),
is given by the set of pairs recursively defined as follows:
Basic(M)
=


{(u, x)} ifM = ([ ], u, x, sh, pr)
⋃
i
Basic(Mi ) if

M = ([M1, . . . , Mn ], u, x, sh, pr)∨
M = uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr)

∧ n ≥ 1. 
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Next we formally define what a Pareto optimum is. In short, a Pareto optimum is
a configuration where no more fair exchanges can be performed, that is, exchanges
improving some agents but without worsening any other agent. This concept considers all
the basic agents together in the sense that we can ignore the actual hierarchical structure
of markets.
In the following we are interested in determining whether the final distributions reached
by a hierarchical system are as good as those given by Pareto optima. This will allow
us to assess the economic performance of hierarchical systems. In our first approach the
effect of transaction and shipping costs is not considered. As a result, it is irrelevant who
gives each item to whom, provided that the total amount of given items equals the total
amount of received items. Thus, in order to consider possible exchanges of resources,
the only requirements are that the exchange neither creates nor destroys resources in the
global market and that no agent has debts after the exchange. Later we will introduce a
complementary concept to take into account additional costs (we will call it the α-Pareto
optimum).
Definition 11. Let S = {(u1, x1), . . . , (um , xm)} be a set of pairs. We say that S is a Pareto
optimum if there do not exist tuples of resources y1, . . . , ym such that all of the following
conditions hold:
• ∑i yi = 0,
• for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have xi + yi ≥ 0,
• for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have ui (xi + yi ) ≥ ui (xi ), and
• there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that u j (x j + y j ) > u j (x j ). 
In order to define a new notion of Pareto optimality where additional costs are
considered, we need a formalism for properly abstracting these costs. We provide a
function for denoting the additional costs associated with an exchange of resources. In
this function, the first parameter is an index whose purpose is to identify the agent that
must pay the additional costs. The subsequent parameters contain the tuples of resources
that this agent receives from the other agents. As we did before, we assume again that there
are p different kinds of resources.
Definition 12. Let S = {(u1, x1), . . . , (um , xm)} be a set of pairs. A function of additional
costs for S is a function α : N×Rp+ × · · · ×Rp+︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
−→ R+. 
Additional costs will affect the assessment of whether there exists a good exchange. In
fact, an exchange will be good only if it is so in spite of these costs (i.e. after these costs are
added). In contrast with the previous notion of Pareto optimum, we will have to identify
who gives each item to whom since additional costs will depend on it. In order to do so,
exchanges will be formalized by using exchange matrices.
Definition 13. Let S = {(u1, x1), . . . , (um , xm)} be a set of pairs and α be a function
of additional costs for S. We say that S is an α-Pareto optimum if there do not exist
E ∈ (Rp+)m×m , with yi =
∑
j E j i −
∑
j Ei j for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, such that all of the following
conditions hold:
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• ∑i yi = 0,
• for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have xi + yi − (0, . . . , 0, α(i, E1i , . . . , Emi )) ≥ 0 and
ui (xi + yi − (0, . . . , 0, α(i, E1i , . . . , Emi ))) ≥ ui (xi ), and
• there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that u j (x j + y j − (0, . . . , 0, α( j, E1 j , . . . , Emj ))) >
u j (x j ). 
Next we provide a mechanism for computing a function of additional costs which
matches the additional costs incurred by the agents of a given hierarchical market. This
construction will allow us to apply the notion of α-Pareto optimum to a hierarchical market
in such a way that the additional costs of the market are properly considered. In order to
compute the function of additional costs we must take into account both shipping and
transaction costs. For each possible exchange in which the agent i receives from the other
agents the tuples of resources y1, . . . , ym , the following recursive definition computes, for
each level, the additional costs associated with those resources that cannot be exchanged in
a lower level of the hierarchy (and so they have to be exchanged in the current level). Then,
we remove those resources and we perform a recursive call for the lower level. Recursive
calls stop when all the subagents of the market are actually basic agents, which is ensured
in the following definition by the condition n = m.
Definition 14. Let M = uncomp((M1, . . . , Mn), sh, pr) be an uncompleted market
having as transaction function tr. Let us consider the set of basic agents Basic(M) =
{(u1, x1), . . . , (um, xm)}. The function of additional costs associated with M is a function
αM such that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and tuples of resources y1, . . . , ym we have
αM (i, y1, . . . , ym) =


∑
k
(sh(yk) + tr(yk)) if n = m
αM ′(i, v1, . . . , vr ) +
∑
k
(sh(zk) + tr(zk)) otherwise
where M ′ is the (unique) agent belonging to the set {M1, . . . , Mn} such that (ui , xi ) ∈
Basic(M ′). Since Basic(M ′) ⊆ Basic(M), we have considered Basic(M ′) =
{(u′1, v1), . . . , (u′r , vr )} ⊆ {(u1, x1), . . . , (um, xm)} = Basic(M). Besides this, for any
1 ≤ k ≤ m we have that zk is given by
zk =
{
yk if (uk, xk) 	∈ Basic(M ′)
0 otherwise . 
The following result states that the utility function of each market can be defined in
terms of the utilities of the basic agents located in the leaves of the hierarchical tree. This
is an alternative vision since this function was formerly defined in terms of the utilities
of each of the (higher order) subagents directly linked to the corresponding market. More
precisely, the result shows that the utility of any market is the addition of the utilities of its
basic agents, provided that some additional constraints, relating to the minimal utility in
each lower level, hold. However, these constraints can be rewritten in terms of the additions
of utilities for some subsets of basic agents. The proof of Theorem 1 uses three auxiliary
results (Lemmas 3–5) that are given in the appendix of the paper.
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Theorem 1 (Utility Transformation Theorem). Let us consider a completed market
A = ([A′1, . . . , A′n], u, x, sh, pr) such that for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have A′j =
(L ′j , u′j , x ′j , sh
′
j , pr
′
j ). Let S = Basic(A) = {(u1, x1), . . . , (um , xm)}, and for any
1 ≤ j ≤ n let S′j = Basic(A′j ). Then, there exists H ∈ P(P(N) × R+) such that
u(z) = max



 ∑
(u j ,x j )∈S
u j (z′′j ),
∑
(u j ,x j )∈S ′1
z′′j , . . . ,
∑
(u j ,x j )∈S ′n
z′′j


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(u j ,x j )∈S
z′′j = z
∧
∀ (H, v) ∈ H :∑
j∈H
u j (z′′j ) ≥ v


. (1)
Proof. By Definition 8 we have
u(z) = max


(∑
j
u′j (z′j ), z′1, . . . , z′n
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j
z′j = z
∧
∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ n : u′j (z′j ) ≥ w j

 (2)
for some constant values w1, . . . , wn . We will prove, by structural induction over A, that
the expressions (1) and (2) coincide.
In the anchor case we have n = 0, that is, a market A = ([ ], u, x, sh, pr). Then,
S = {(u, x¯)}, since A is already a basic agent. Thus, the tuple returned by u(z¯) in
expression (2) contains a single component, which gives the utility of A for the basket
z¯. Let us check whether this value coincides with that returned by the expression (1). This
expression returns the utility of A for some tuple z¯′′1, because the only agent ranged in
the addition is A. The constraint
∑
(u j ,x j )∈S z
′′
j = z imposed by the wording of the result
implies z′′1 = z. Thus, by setting H = ∅ we have that the utilities returned by u(z¯) in each
of the expressions coincide, so the result holds.
Let us consider now the inductive case, that is, the set {A′1, . . . , A′n} is non-
empty. Let Q = {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ L ′i 	= [ ]}. For any i ∈ Q let us consider the set
S′i = {(ur1, xr1), . . . , (urmi , xrmi )} and the list L ′i = [Ai1, . . . , Aiki ], where for any 1 ≤ l ≤
ki we have Ail = (Lil , uil , xil , shil , pril ). Finally, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ ki let Sij = Basic(Aij ).
Obviously, if i 	∈ Q then ui represents the utility of the basic agent A′i . Otherwise, by
induction hypothesis, we have that for any i ∈ Q
u′i (z) = max



 ∑
(u j ,x j )∈S ′i
u j (z′′j ),
∑
(ul ,xl )∈Si1
z′′l , . . . ,
∑
(ul ,xl )∈Siki
z′′l


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(u j ,x j )∈S ′i
z′′j = z
∧
∀ (H, v) ∈ H′i :∑
j∈H
u j (z′′j ) ≥ v


for some sets H′i ∈ P(P(N) × R+). Let us show that on substituting in expression (2)
all the terms u′i , with i ∈ Q, by the previous expression we get the expression (1).
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Let us remark that for any functions fi j and boolean conditions Ci and C ′i j we have that
the following auxiliary property holds:
max
{∑
i
max
({∑
j
fi j (xi j )
∣∣∣∣∣∑j xi j = xi ∧ ∀ j C ′i j
})∣∣∣∣∣∑i xi = x ∧ ∀i Ci
}
‖
max
{∑
i j
fi j (xi j )
∣∣∣∣∣∑i j xi j = x ∧ ∀i Ci ∧ ∀i j C ′i j
}
.
We got the previous result by successively applying Lemma 3, to exchange the positions
of the first addition and the second maximization, and Lemma 4, to eliminate the second
maximization. Let us remark that the quantifier ∃ y ′ required in Lemma 4 to embrace
the conditions introduced by the maximization operators is superfluous since the equality∑
i j xi j = x holds iff ∃ (x1, . . . , xn) :
∑
i xi = x ∧ ∀ i :
∑
j xi j = xi . This is so because
such an expression allows each xi to take a unique value. Though not given explicitly, we
assume that any occurrence of a term xi in Ci is replaced by
∑
j xi j in the right hand side of
the equality. The reason is that the maximization carried out by the outermost maximization
operator in the left hand side is performed over (x1, . . . , xn), while the right hand side
operator maximizes over (x11, . . . , xnm). So, in the formula obtained after substituting all
terms u′i in expression (2) we can both transfer the boolean conditions to the upper level
and make the internal maximization operator collapse with the external one.
Now we will relate the previous expression and our formulae. The conditions Ci and C ′i j
match the constraints over the minimal addition of utilities of subagents for each specific
agent. Thus, the term ∀i Ci is in fact instantiated as ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ n : u′j (z′j ) ≥ w j
while the term ∀i j C ′i j is instantiated as the quantification ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (H, v) ∈ H′i :∑
j∈H u j (z′′j ) ≥ v. Let us remark that ∀i j C ′i j already follows the pattern ∀ (H, v) ∈ H :∑
j∈H u j (z′′j ) ≥ v because we can create a single set H by performing the union of all
the sets H′i . Let us consider the term ∀i Ci . After applying the induction hypothesis to
replace each u′i by the expression we gave above, we can remove the new maximization
operators. This is so because for any functions fi j and boolean conditions D′, D′1, . . . , D′n ,
with D′ ⇒ ∀i D′i , the following auxiliary property holds:
max
{∑
i j
fi j (xi j )
∣∣∣∣∣D′ ∧ ∀i max
({∑
j
fi j (x ′i j )
∣∣∣∣∣∑j x ′i j =
∑
j
xi j ∧ D′i
})
≥ wi
}
‖
max
{∑
i j
fi j (xi j )
∣∣∣∣∣D′ ∧ ∀i ∑j fi j (xi j ) ≥ wi
}
.
We obtain this equality since, by applying Lemma 5, we have that the first maximization
operator already maximizes the term
∑
j fi j (x ′i j ) for each i . Let us note that the
quantifier ∃ z′ required in Lemma 5 to embrace the conditions introduced by the innermost
maximization can be easily removed. In fact, we will show that the condition
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D′ ∧ ∀i ∃(x ′i1, . . . , x ′im) :
(∑
j
fi j (x ′i j ) ≥ wi ∧
∑
j
x ′i j =
∑
j
xi j ∧ D′i
)
can be indeed replaced by the condition D′ ∧ ∀i ∑ j fi j (xi j ) ≥ wi .
Let us suppose that (x11, . . . , xnm) returns the maximal value of
∑
i j fi j (xi j ) such that
D′ ∧ ∀i ∃(x ′i1, . . . , x ′im ) : (
∑
j fi j (x ′i j ) ≥ wi ∧
∑
j x ′i j =
∑
j xi j ∧ D′i ) holds.
Since both
∑
i j fi j (xi j ) =
∑
i
∑
j fi j (xi j ) and ∀i
∑
j fi j (x ′i j ) ≥ wi hold, we have
∀i ∑ j fi j (xi j ) ≥ wi . Let us note that if ∃i ∑ j fi j (xi j ) < wi then, on setting xi1, . . . , xim
equal to x ′i1, . . . , x ′im , the value of
∑
i j fi j (xi j ) would be higher than the maximal, which
is a contradiction. Hence, (x11, . . . , xnm) fulfills the condition D′ ∧ ∀i ∑ j fi j (xi j ) ≥ wi .
The reverse implication is trivially obtained by setting (x ′11, . . . , x ′nm) = (x11, . . . , xnm)
and taking into account that since D′ ⇒ ∀i D′i the tuple (x ′11, . . . , x ′nm) fulfills ∀i D′i .
In the context of our formula, we have D′ ≡ ∑i j xi j = x ∧ ∀i j C ′i j and D′i ≡ ∀ j C ′i j .
The additional conditions D′1, . . . , D′n appearing in the term ∀i Ci are redundant since they
are the same as those imposed by D′. Thus, ∀i Ci can be replaced by ∀i ∑ j fi j (xi j ) ≥ wi
or, by using the notation of our formula, by the expression ∀i ∑(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i ) u j (z′′j ) ≥
wi . It readily follows that the terms representing ∀i Ci and ∀i j C ′i j can be joined together to
create one single set H including both conditions. Finally, let us remark that the elements
that do not represent utility in the tuple returned by the function u (i.e. those specifying how
the resources should be delivered among subagents) are exactly the inputs for each function
u′i . Since the expression defining u′i , by the induction hypothesis, states
∑
(u j ,x j )∈S ′i z
′′
j = z,
where z is that input, we have that these elements match those given in the wording of the
result. 
The previous result shows that, under certain conditions, the utility of a market is just
the addition of the utilities of the subagents. The following lemma (whose proof is given in
the appendix) states that if an exchange is either neutral or positive for all the basic agents
of a market then it will also be so for all the subagents that are directly linked to the market.
Lemma 1 (Propagation Lemma). Let us consider a completed market A = ([A′1, . . . , A′n],
u, x, sh, pr), with A′i = (L ′i , u′i , x ′i , sh′i , pr′i ), and let y1, . . . , ym be tuples of resources. Let
Basic(A) = {(u1, x1), . . . , (um , xm)}. We have
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m : ui (xi + yi ) ≥ ui (xi )
⇓
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n : u′i

x ′i + ∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i )
y j

 ≥ u′i (x ′i ). 
In the following result we go one step further. We show that if an exchange is neutral or
positive for all the basic agents of a market, being strictly positive for some of them, then
this exchange is neutral or positive for all of the subagents that are directly linked to the
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market, being strictly positive for some of these subagents. The proof is also given in the
appendix of the paper.
Lemma 2 (Improvement Propagation Lemma). Let us consider a completed market A =
([A′1, . . . , A′n], u, x, sh, pr), with A′i = (L ′i , u′i , x ′i , sh′i , pr′i ), and let y1, . . . , ym be tuples
of resources. Let Basic(A) = {(u1, x1), . . . , (um, xm)}. Finally, let us consider R ⊆
{1, . . . , m}. Then,
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m : ui (xi + yi ) ≥ ui (xi ) ∧ ∀ i ∈ R : ui (xi + yi ) > ui (xi )
⇓
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n :


u′i

x ′i + ∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i )
y j

 ≥ u′i (x ′i )
∧

{ j | (u j , x j ) ∈ Basic(A′i )} ∩ R 	= ∅⇓
u′i

x ′i + ∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i )
y j

 > u′i (x ′i )




. 
If what is good for the basic agents is also good for the subagents of a market,
then we can prove that the final configuration of a hierarchical system must be a Pareto
optimum, provided that the additional costs are set to 0. This result, formally presented
in the forthcoming Theorem 2, is important for our framework because it implies that the
economic efficiency in a hierarchical system matches that of a single centralized market.
Afterwards we will provide a similar result for the case when shipping and transaction
costs are not necessarily nil.
Theorem 2 (Optimality Theorem). Let M, M ′ be markets and A be an agent such that
M  ∗M ′ ↪→ ms(σ (A)). If transaction and shipping costs are set to zero then the
distribution of resources provided by Basic(A) represents a Pareto optimum.
Proof. We prove the result by structural induction over A. As the anchor case we have
A = ([ ], u, x, sh, pr). In this case the result trivially holds since any market conformed by
a single agent is a Pareto optimum.
As the inductive case we consider a market A = ([A1, . . . , An], u, x, sh, pr), with
Ai = (Li , ui , xi , shi , pri ). By the induction hypothesis we assume that each of the
sets Basic(Ai ) represents a Pareto optimum. Let us suppose that the set Basic(A) =
{(u1, x1), . . . , (um, xm)} is not a Pareto optimum. We will show that we get a contradiction.
If the distribution is not a Pareto optimum then there exists an exchange of resources
y1, . . . , ym in Basic(A) such that the following conditions hold:
• for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have xi + yi ≥ 0 and ui (xi + yi ) ≥ ui (xi ),
• ∑1≤i≤m yi = 0, and• there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ m such that u j (x j + y j ) > u j (x j ).
There are two possibilities: either all of the (basic) agents involved in that exchange are
represented in A by the same agent Ak (i.e. for any 1 ≤ l ≤ m such that yl 	= 0
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we have (ul , xl) ∈ Basic(Ak)) or not. In the former case we get a contradiction since,
by the induction hypothesis, we assume that Basic(Ak) represents a Pareto optimum.
Let us consider the latter case. By Lemma 2, the modification of the resources of each
subagent Ai by
∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(Ai ) y j yields a configuration where the utility of some
subagents improves and no utility worsens. However, this implies that M ′ 	 does not
hold because there are more valid exchanges to perform. Thus, a transition such as
M ′ ↪→ ms(σ (A)) is not possible because it requires M ′ to be a completed market while it
is not. Therefore, in both cases we have a contradiction by assuming that Basic(A) is not
a Pareto optimum. 
Regarding the general situation, that is transaction and shipping costs are greater than
zero, the classical Pareto optimum concept does not apply and we have to use the notion of
the α-Pareto optimum (see Definition 13). For instance, a desirable exchange in a free or
low transaction fee environment could be a non-desirable exchange in an expensive one.
Then, the set of optima is different because of the effect of the fees. The next result states
that a completed market will be an α-Pareto optimum for the set of basic agents. This
means that a hierarchical market presents the same economic efficiency as a single market
where the additional costs are those of the hierarchical market.
Theorem 3 (Theorem of α-optimality). Let M, M ′ be markets and A be an agent such
that M ∗M ′ ↪→ ms(σ (A)). Let α be the function of additional costs associated with M.
We have that the distribution of resources provided by Basic(A) represents an α-Pareto
optimum.
Proof. The proof, again by reductio ad absurdum, follows the same pattern as that of
Theorem 2. Let us remark that Theorem 1 and Lemmas 1 and 2 are still applicable because
they are concerned only with the utility functions of agents. The main difference with
respect to the proof of Theorem 2 is that, in this case, the assumption considers that there
exists a possible good exchange in spite of the additional costs. However, if there were a
good exchange, by Lemma 2, the utility of agents would improve after the exchange, so
M ′ is not completed and we get a contradiction. 
6. Conclusions
The main objective of this paper has been to introduce a formal framework for
specifying and analyzing e-barter systems. These systems allow customers to exchange
products through the use of electronic agents representing their preferences. In order to
allow the precise specification of e-barter systems we have introduced a formal syntax,
based on classical process algebras, to define them. We have also presented a semantics
for syntactic terms based on inference rules. One of the main advantages of using a formal
framework is that we may study properties of these systems.
In this paper we have concentrated on studying general properties that any e-barter
system fulfills. In particular, we have proved that a hierarchical structure may reach the
same optima as a centralized market. We have also shown that this kind of hierarchical
structure presents additional advantages. Specifically, it allows one to diminish shipping
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costs and it reduces the computational power (in terms of exchanged messages) needed to
implement the market(s).
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Appendix: Auxiliary results used in Section 5
In this appendix we give the proofs of some results that are used in Section 5. First, we
introduce a formal definition of the maximization operator. This notation is useful only for
facilitating the formal formulation of the forthcoming lemmas. In the following definition
we distinguish between the names of the variables (denoted by x and y) and their actual
values (denoted by x ′ and y ′, respectively).
Definition 15. Let Σ be a signature, T be a set of data types, and α : Σ −→ T be a
typing function. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Σ n and y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ Σm be two tuples
of symbols such that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have α(xi ) = Ti ∈ T and for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m
we have α(yi ) = T ′i ∈ T . Let us have x ′ ∈ T1 × · · · × Tn , f : T ′1 × · · · × T ′m −→ R, and
L : T1 × · · · × Tn × T ′1 × · · · × T ′m −→ Bool.
We define the maximal f such that L holds given x, x ′, and y, denoted by
maxx=x ′y ( f, L), as the value of f (y ′), with y ′ ∈ T ′1 × · · · × T ′m , such that
• L(x ′, y ′) holds and
• for any y ′′ ∈ T ′1 × · · · × T ′m we have that L(x ′, y ′′) implies f (y ′) ≥ f (y ′′). 
For instance, if f (y) = 2 · y and L(x, y) = (y ≤ 3 · x) then maxx=10y ( f, L) = 60. This
is so because the value y ′ that maximizes f (y ′) while fulfilling L(10, y ′) is 30. Let us note
that it is straightforward to transform expressions using the new operator into expressions
without any occurrence of it. For example, maxx=10y ( f, L) can be formulated simply as
max{2 · y | y ≤ 30}.
Next we present the three lemmas that were used in the proof of Theorem 1. The first
result shows that, under certain conditions, we can exchange the positions of an addition
and a maximization operator.
Lemma 3. Let g : T k → R, f1, . . . , fk : T → R, L1, . . . , Lk : T 2 → Bool, and
L ′ : T 2k → Bool be functions such that for any x ′1, . . . , x ′k, y ′1, . . . , y ′k ∈ T we have
L ′(x ′1, . . . , x
′
k, y
′
1, . . . , y
′
k) = L1(x ′1, y ′1) ∧ · · · ∧ Lk(x ′k, y ′k) and g(y ′1, . . . , y ′k) =∑
i fi (y ′i ). Then,
k∑
i=1
(max
xi=x ′i
yi ( fi , Li )) = max(x1,...,xk)=(x
′
1,...,x
′
k)
(y1,...,yk) (g, L
′).
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Proof. Let us suppose that for some values b1, . . . , bk we have that Li (x ′i , bi ) holds
and that maxxi=x
′
i
yi ( fi , Li ) = fi (bi ), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k. First, we easily get∑k
i=1(max
xi=x ′i
yi ( fi , Li )) =
∑k
i=1 fi (bi ). We only need to prove that the expression
max
(x1,...,xk)=(x ′1,...,x ′k)
(y1,...,yk) (g, L
′) is also equal to
∑k
i=1 fi (bi ). Let us suppose that this is not the
case. Then, by taking into account the way g and L ′ are defined, we have that there exists
a tuple (b′1, . . . , b′k) 	= (b1, . . . , bk) such that max
(x1,...,xk)=(x ′1,...,x ′k)
(y1,...,yk) (g, L
′) =∑ki=1 fi (b′i ),
with L ′(x ′1, . . . , x ′k, b′1, . . . , b′k) = True. Thus, we have that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
Li (x ′i , b′i ) holds. Besides this, since L ′ is the conjunction of L1, . . . , Lk , we have that
L ′(x ′1, . . . , x ′k, b1, . . . , bk) holds. So, (b1, . . . , bk) is one of the cases to be considered
for performing the maximization max(x1,...,xk)=(x
′
1,...,x
′
k)
(y1,...,yk) (g, L
′). However, if
∑k
i=1 fi (b′i ) is
the maximal value obtained by considering all the possible cases, then
∑k
i=1 fi (b′i ) >∑k
i=1 fi (bi ). Hence, there must exist 1 ≤ r ≤ k such that fr (b′r ) > fr (br ) holds.
Nevertheless, we have that fi (bi ) is the maximal value with Li (x ′i , bi ) = True. Therefore,∑k
i=1 fi (b′i ) >
∑k
i=1 fi (bi ) holds only if for some index 1 ≤ w ≤ k we have that
Lw(x ′w, b′w) does not hold. Thus, we conclude that L ′(x ′1, . . . , x
′
k, b
′
1, . . . , b
′
k) is also
false since the predicate L ′ is the conjunction of the predicates L1, . . . , Lk . So, we get
a contradiction. 
Next we give some conditions so that the maximal of the maximal can be expressed in
terms of a single maximization operator.
Lemma 4. Let β, f : T → R and L ′, L1, L2 : T 2 → Bool be functions such that
for any q, x ′, y ′, v′ ∈ T we have L ′(x ′, v′) = ∃ y ′ : L1(y ′, v′) ∧ L2(x ′, y ′) and
β(q) = maxz=qv ( f, L1). Then,
maxx=x ′y (β, L2) = maxx=x
′
v ( f, L ′).
Proof. Let us suppose that maxx=x ′v ( f, L ′) = a, that is, a is the highest value of f (v′)
such that there exists y ′ fulfilling L1(y ′, v′) and L2(x ′, y ′). We will show that such a
condition matches the condition over which maxx=x ′y (β, L2) maximizes. This would make
both expressions return the same value.
Let us suppose that maxx=x ′y (β, L2) = b, that is, b is the maximal value of
maxz=y
′′
v ( f, L1) such that L2(x ′, y ′′) holds. Then, there also exists v′ such that L1(y ′′, v′)
holds and f (v′) is the maximal value such that L1(y ′′, v′) holds. By construction we have
f (v′) = b. Looking at the requirements over y ′′ we deduce that y ′′ is forced to fulfill
both L1(y ′′, v′) and L2(x ′, y ′′). Besides this, the maximization returns the maximal value
of f (v′) for which v′ fulfills such a condition. Since this is exactly the constraint that L ′
requires in maxx=x ′v ( f, L ′) (renaming y ′ as y ′′) we have that the two expressions return the
same value. 
In the following result we prove that, under some conditions, a maximization that
contains a certain requirement expressed in terms of a certain maximal value can also
be expressed without using the maximization operator in the requirement.
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Lemma 5. Let γ, L, L1, L2 : T 2 → Bool and f, g : T → R be functions such that
for any x ′, y ′, z′ ∈ T we have γ (x ′, y ′) = L2(x ′, y ′) ∧ (maxv=y
′
z (g, L1) ≥ K ) and
L(x ′, y ′) = ∃ z′ : ((g(z′) ≥ K ) ∧ L1(y ′, z′)) ∧ L2(x ′, y ′). Then,
maxx=x ′y ( f, γ ) = maxx=x
′
y ( f, L).
Proof. We have that maxx=x ′y ( f, γ ) returns the maximal value f (y ′) such that
γ (x ′, y ′) holds. In addition, γ (x ′, y ′) implies that L2(x ′, y ′) holds and that we have
maxv=y
′
z (g, L1) ≥ K . Besides this, if maxv=y
′
z (g, L1) ≥ K , then the maximal g(z′) such
that L1(y ′, z′) holds fulfills g(z′) ≥ K . That is, the values y ′ of y considered in the
maximization maxx=x ′y ( f, γ ) are those for which L2(x ′, y ′) holds and the maximal z′ such
that L1(y ′, z′) holds also fulfills g(z′) ≥ K . Let us note that this is equivalent to searching
among those values y ′ such that L2(x ′, y ′) holds and for some z′ we have that L1(y ′, z′)
holds, with g(z′) ≥ K . This is so because if these conditions hold for the value z′ that
returns the maximum, then they will also hold for some z′ (in particular, the same). Besides
this, if these conditions hold for some z′, then they will also hold for the value returning the
maximum such that L1(y ′, z′) holds. This is so because the condition g(z′) ≥ K cannot
become false for some z′ that returns the highest value. Since these requirements match
those imposed by the function L, we deduce that the value of maxx=x ′y ( f, γ ) must be equal
to that of maxx=x ′(y,z)( f, L). 
Finally, we present the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 (Propagation Lemma). Let us consider a completed market A = ([A′1, . . . , A′n],
u, x, sh, pr), with A′i = (L ′i , u′i , x ′i , sh′i , pr′i ), and let y1, . . . , ym be tuples of resources. Let
Basic(A) = {(u1, x1), . . . , (um , xm)}. We have
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m : ui (xi + yi ) ≥ ui (xi )
⇓
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n : u′i

x ′i + ∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i )
y j

 ≥ u′i (x ′i ).
Proof. Let P = {A′i | L ′i = [ ]}, that is, P is the set of basic agents directly linked to
A. We consider the following two cases. First, if P = {A′1, . . . , A′n} then the previous
result trivially holds since the two inequalities coincide. Second, let us suppose that
P 	= {A′1, . . . , A′n}. Let us consider an agent A′i 	∈ P . Given the fact that L ′i is not empty, let
us suppose that L ′i = [Ai1, . . . , Aiki ], with Ail = (Lil , uil , xil , shil , pril ). Let S′i = Basic(A′i ),
with S′i = ((ur1, xr1), . . . , (urmi , xrmi )), and for any 1 ≤ j ≤ ki let Sij = Basic(Aij ). By
Definition 8 we have
u′i (z) = max
{(∑
j
uij (z
′
j ), z
′
1, . . . , z
′
ki
) ∣∣∣∣∣∑j z′j = z
∧ ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ ki : uij (z′j ) ≥ w j
}
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for some constant values w1, . . . , wki . Now, by applying Theorem 1, we also obtain
u′i (z) = max



 ∑
(u j ,x j )∈S ′i
u j (z′′j ),
∑
(ul ,xl )∈Si1
z′′l , . . . ,
∑
(ul ,xl )∈Siki
z′′l


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j∈{r1,...,rmi }
z′′j = z
∧
∀ (H, v) ∈ H′i :∑
j∈H
u j (z′′j ) ≥ v


for some H′i ∈ P(P(N) × R+). Given the fact that A′1, . . . , A′n are all completed we have
that the modifications of resources have already been propagated to the basic agents. Thus,∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i ) u j (x j ) = u′i (x ′i ). If for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have ui (xi + yi ) ≥ ui (xi )
then it is clear that we also have
∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i ) u j (x j + y j ) ≥ u′i (x ′i ). Besides this, we
can also deduce that u′i (x ′i +
∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i ) y j ) ≥
∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i ) u j (x j + y j ). This
is so because the modification
∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i ) y j can be propagated among the basic
agents of A′i in such a way that the addition of their new utilities (that is, the new utility
obtained by A′i ) matches at least that in the right hand side of the inequality. This can be
done by modifying the resources of each basic agent (ui , xi ) ∈ Basic(A′i ) according to yi .
Let us remark that the constraints ∀ (H, v) ∈ H′i :
∑
j∈H u j (z′′j ) ≥ v hold in u′i because
if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m we have ui (xi + yi ) ≥ ui (xi), then for any subset of basic agents
S′ ⊆ Basic(A′i ) we may also conclude that
∑
(u j ,x j )∈S ′ u j (x j + y j ) ≥
∑
(u j ,x j )∈S ′ u j (x j ).
Thus, the result holds. 
Lemma 2 (Improvement Propagation Lemma). Let us consider a completed market A =
([A′1, . . . , A′n], u, x, sh, pr), with A′i = (L ′i , u′i , x ′i , sh′i , pr′i ), and let y1, . . . , ym be tuples
of resources. Let Basic(A) = {(u1, x1), . . . , (um, xm)}. Finally, let us consider R ⊆
{1, . . . , m}. Then,
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m : ui (xi + yi ) ≥ ui (xi ) ∧ ∀ i ∈ R : ui (xi + yi ) > ui (xi )
⇓
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n :


u′i

x ′i + ∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i )
y j

 ≥ u′i (x ′i )
∧

{ j | (u j , x j ) ∈ Basic(A′i )} ∩ R 	= ∅⇓
u′i

x ′i + ∑
(u j ,x j )∈Basic(A′i )
y j

 > u′i (x ′i )




.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. Thus, let us consider only the case of
agents whose utility increases after the exchange. Let A′i be an agent such that { j |(u j , x j ) ∈
Basic(A′i )} ∩ R 	= ∅. Let us note that the utility of A′i is strictly higher after the exchange
because there exists (uk, xk) ∈ Basic(A′i ) such that uk(xk + yk) > uk(xk) and for any
(u j , x j ) ∈ Basic(A′i ) we have that u j (x j + y j ) ≥ u j (x j ). Since there is a configuration of
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resources where no subagent of A′i worsens and some of them improve, we may conclude
that the addition of utilities of subagents of A′i in the best configuration is strictly higher
after the exchange. 
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